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The Ba‘athist blackout? Selective goods
provision and political violence in the
Syrian civil war
Alexander De Juan & Andre´ Bank
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract
Many authoritarian regimes selectively provide critical segments of the population with privileged access to goods and
services, expecting political support in return. This article is interested in the effects of this regime strategy: Is violent
opposition less likely to occur in subnational regions bound to the ruling elite through such patron–client networks?
For its empirical analysis, the article makes use of crowdsourcing data on the number and geospatial distribution of
fatalities in the Syrian civil war fromMarch 2011 to November 2012. In terms of selective goods provision, the focus
is on the electricity sector. Satellite images of the earth at night are used to proxy spatial variations in the public dis-
tribution of electricity in times of power shortages. These data are complemented with information from the last
Syrian population census of 2004. Estimations from fixed effect logit models lend support to the hypothesis that
the risk of violence has been lower in subdistricts that have been favored by the ruling regime in terms of preferential
access to material goods. This hypothesis is further corroborated with qualitative evidence from Syrian localities.
Keywords
civil war, crowdsourcing, nightlights, public goods, Syria
Introduction
Ruling elites cannot maintain their grip on power through
violence and repression alone. Thus, in many cases they
provide political or material goods and services to critical
segments of the population in return for the latter’s sup-
port or at least acquiescence. This article aims to investi-
gate whether such patron–client networks reduce the
risk of violent opposition from those parts of the popula-
tion that have profited from selective redistribution.
Previous studies have found general evidence of the
effectiveness of goods provision for political stability
(Fjelde & de Soysa, 2009; Taydas & Peksen, 2012).
Their cross-country focus does not allow, however, for
the consideration of uneven redistribution. More often
than not, the provision of goods and services is not used
as an instrument to instill support among the masses, but
rather to sustain the backing of specific segments of the
population deemed particularly relevant.
We seek to contribute to the debate on the role of
selective goods provision in regimes’ attempts to create
and uphold narrow patron–client networks for political
stability. Syria serves as our empirical case. Rather than
investigating overall levels of goods provision, we analyze
actual preferential treatment of specific subnational
regions. We want to ascertain whether Syrian subdis-
tricts have been less at risk of experiencing violence in
the current civil war if they have been favored by the
state in the distribution of scarce material resources in
the recent past.
Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and else-
where have been particularly reluctant to provide mean-
ingful socio-economic information. Therefore, our
analysis is based mainly on information that is outside
of state control. First, we have made use of so-called
crowdsourcing data on the number of fatalities in the
Syrian civil war; these data stem from decentralized
reports filed by Syrians through a publicly accessible
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online platform. Second, we have used digitized high-
resolution satellite images of the earth at night to mea-
sure spatial unevenness in the provision of an essential
public service: electricity. We have complemented these
data with information from the last Syrian population
census, undertaken in 2004, to build a new dataset of
Syria’s 274 subdistricts. We have performed cross-
sectional logit estimations, including fixed effects, at the
level of the country’s 14 governorates. Our findings lend
support to the hypothesis that the risk of violence has
been lower in subdistricts that have been favored by the
ruling regime in terms of access to electricity in times of
severe power shortages.
Our results contribute to ongoing discussions in var-
ious ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to undertake a systematic study on the role of selective
redistribution in political violence at the subnational
level. Focusing on the allocation of material resources
in times of scarcity, we propose an innovative approach
for the conceptualization of preferential treatment and
associated patron–client relations. Complementing com-
parable cross-country studies, we lend support to the
hypothesis that the inclusion of citizens into state patron-
age networks can be an effective tool for encouraging com-
pliance and reducing the risk of violent opposition.
Selective redistribution and political stability
Ruling elites need to secure support from among the
population to reduce the risk of violent opposition. Cer-
tainly, regime repression and violence are central for
political stability, as classic theorists ranging from
Hannah Arendt to Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo
Machiavelli have shown. However, no government, not
even in highly authoritarian states, is likely to survive in
the long run without a minimum degree of (quasi-)vol-
untary compliance (Gerschewski, 2013; Levi, 2006: 7),
as the exclusive use of repression would be too costly
to sustain over an extended period of time (Wintrobe,
2000: 388). Even though regimes might consider hard
repression necessary to quell protests in the short or
mid-term, its continuous, long-term use endangers the
respective government both by draining crucial state
resources and by increasing the likelihood of further and
more violent rebellions. Non-repressive compliance can
only be generated if the population receives something
in return (Levi, 2006). Thus, ruling elites may try to win
and uphold support by providing material incentives,
such as economic benefits or specific tax rates (Acemo-
glu, Verdier & Robinson, 2004; Gandhi & Przeworski,
2007). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that
public spending can be used to ‘buy’ allegiance and thus
reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to
the ruling elite.
Various empirical studies have investigated the role of
goods provision in political violence. The findings, how-
ever, are mixed. For instance, Taydas & Peksen (2012)
find a significant negative connection between welfare
spending and civil conflict onset, whereas Fjelde
(2009) presents evidence revealing that goods provision
in oil-rich states reduces the risk of violent opposition
(see also Fjelde, 2010; Fjelde & de Soysa, 2009).
Bussmann (2009) does not find any significant connec-
tion between state expenditure on health and education
and the onset of violent conflict.
Although we acknowledge that this research strand
has contributed greatly to our understanding of the role
of public spending, we argue that it neglects an essential
feature of goods provision in many states: its very selec-
tive and targeted nature. In principle, regimes may try to
provide benefits to the population at large in line with
the arguments outlined above. However, the higher the
number of beneficiaries, the lower the absolute value of
rents for each beneficiary, including the members of the
ruling regime themselves. For this reason, instead of dis-
tributing resources evenly and broadly, regimes tend to
selectively distribute them to a limited number of people,
basing their power on support from specific segments of
the population (Acemoglu, Verdier & Robinson, 2004;
Wintrobe, 2000). The patron receives political compli-
ance and support in return for preferential treatment of
the clients.
We are interested in the efficacy of such a strategy.1
We assume that people will be less likely to engage in
protest and violence against the ruling regime in regions
that have been integrated into narrow patron–client net-
works and have profited from the state’s policy in abso-
lute and relative terms. People have an interest in
upholding the status quo in order to retain their privi-
leged position. The lower the support base of the
1 There is a lively debate in the field of political economy about the
determinants of material allocations (Burgess et al., 2010; Kramon &
Posner, 2012; Weinstein, 2011): do states reward traditional
supporters, buy off political rivals, or invest in the ‘swing’ regions?
Mirroring the inconclusive results of such studies, we believe that
most regimes make use of selective redistribution in a complex and
strategic way. They establish patron–client relations with different
parts of society for various reasons – with some because of narrow
ethnic ties, with others because they may pose a political risk, and
with others because they are economically important. Given this
equifinality, we focus on the effects rather than the causes of
patron–client relations.
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opposition within a subnational region, the lower the
risk that the region will be the locus of sustained antistate
action (Wickham-Crowley, 1987).
Conceptualizing and measuring selective
redistribution
A variety of measures have been used to capture subna-
tional variations in the redistribution of material goods.
Welfare spending is a prominent proxy (Taydas &
Peksen, 2012; Weinstein, 2011). Such an indicator,
however, does not capture whether spending results in
any actual benefit to the targeted population. Corruption
and inefficiency may prevent actual delivery and thus
undermine the strength of patron–client networks.
Another type of indicator is state-sponsored infrastruc-
ture, such as roads and schools (Burgess et al., 2010;
Kramon & Posner, 2010). However, the effective provi-
sion of services entails two tasks: providing access to ser-
vices (that is, through infrastructure) and sustaining the
delivery of these services. Defunct services may actually
generate grievances rather than instill support. Other
studies have investigated redistribution using indicators
such as enrollment, literacy, or child mortality rates. The
provision of education or health care is, however, often
shaped by the interventions of international or private
actors (Kramon & Posner, 2010).
We use geographical variations in electricity flows in
times of national power shortages to construct our indi-
cators for selective goods provision. We believe that this
conceptualization offers several potential advantages over
the indicators presented above. First, using information
on flows of power allows us to capture the actual output
of service provision. Second, contrary to other goods,
electricity is in most cases more directly related to gov-
ernment action given that the ruling elites in many devel-
oping countries monopolize – or are at least heavily
involved in – the electricity sector. Third, we believe that
focusing on variations in the provision of this scarce good
allows us to capture selective redistribution more persua-
sively. As argued above, in times of resource abundance,
ruling elites may be inclined to carry out a mass
co-optation strategy. However, the scarcer the resources
to be distributed, the more important it is to make deci-
sions about who receives what. Thus, the allocation of
goods in times of limited availability should provide a
clearer picture of the regime’s priorities in terms of pre-
ferential treatment.
Thus, we investigate geospatial connections between
electricity flows in a time of power scarcity (2007–09)
and the likelihood of violence during the Syrian civil war.
We do not argue that variation in the access to electricity
itself has been responsible for violence – people certainly
did not rise against the regime in 2011 because of previ-
ous power shortages. We believe, however, that the
state’s distribution of electricity has not been randombut
rather a more general strategy of redistribution intended to
sustain the patron–client relations that the stability of the
regime has been based on. Thus, we use the spatial uneven-
ness in the provision of electricity to identify areas that have
been integrated into such patron–client networks.
In the next sections, we demonstrate that such an
approach makes good sense for the case of Syria. First,
we provide a short overview of the events that led to the
civil war and shaped its course. Second, we illustrate the
politics of redistribution under the Ba‘athist regime,
demonstrating that the strategic and uneven distribution
of material goods has been an essential feature of Syrian
politics. Third, we outline some essential characteristics
of the Syrian electricity sector, which has traditionally
played a major role in this strategy.
Syria in the Arab Spring: From uprising to
civil war
The initial protests in Syria were triggered in the south-
ern city of Dar‘a in mid-March 2011, when a group of
teenagers were arrested and tortured for writing the
motto of the Arab Spring (‘the people want the downfall
of the regime’) on house walls. In reaction, the families
and tribal leaders took their protest to the streets. Secu-
rity forces shot at the demonstrators, killing numerous
people and causing further protests that resulted in the
destruction of public facilities and private property. The
regime attempted to quash the growing protests with
massive repression but only succeeded in spreading the
protests to the surrounding villages and cities in the
southern governorate of Hawran (International Crisis
Group, 2011a, 2011b: 12–13; Leenders & Heydemann,
2012; Balanche, 2013).
After March 2011, the protests gradually spread to
almost all governorates in Syria. As the months went
by, a clear militarization of the civil and peaceful antire-
gime protests could be observed (International Crisis
Group, 2012a,b). By early 2012, the violent political
standoff had escalated into a massive civil war. Regime
forces continued their assaults on the rebels’ positions.
They managed to recapture the coastal city of Latakia
early on and reconquer some districts in Homs and Idlib
later. The rebels, on the other hand, dominated the Syr-
ian territories along the Turkish border, the rural coun-
tryside around the central cities of Hama and Homs, the
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outskirts of Damascus, and the area around the southern
city of Dar‘a. The armed opposition has been, however,
unable to overthrow the regime by military means. The
uprising’s increasing militarization – accompanied by
its ‘confessionalization’ along Sunni-versus-Alawi lines
(Balanche, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2012a,b)
– has been countered by the regime’s sustained use of
harsh repressive measures. From March 2011 to the fall
of 2012, Syria’s uprising transformed from a semi-urban,
peaceful uprising to a professionalized, very violent rebel-
lion that has become a brutal civil-war stalemate.
The politics of redistribution in Ba‘athist Syria
The Ba‘ath party’s takeover in Syria in 1963 signified a
drastic shift in rural–urban relations and, in particular,
the rise of the rural periphery. The transformation of the
Syrian countryside, however, has been an uneven pro-
cess. For instance, the Ba‘athist regime invested heavily
in jobs, electricity, schooling, and health services in those
regions where it had a strong foothold – often via asabiya
(primordial group solidarity) ties – and which it consid-
ered crucial for political stability. One notable example
of a region that profited significantly from developmen-
tal measures is the northwestern governorate of Latakia,
from which approximately 75% of the Alawi population
hail (Van Dam, 2011: 9). Similarly, the southern region
of Hawran (including the provincial town of Dar‘a), the
countryside around Aleppo, and the northeastern area of
Deir az-Zor all profited from the Ba‘athist regime’s redis-
tribution strategy (Perthes, 1997: 183; for detailed fig-
ures see Van Dam, 2011).
Such targeted redistribution – together with repres-
sion and ideological legitimation strategies – was the core
technique of political control under Hafiz al-Asad. After
coming to power in November 1970, he continued to
reward those regions that constituted the traditional
backbone of the regime (Perthes, 1997: 181–185). Rep-
resenting the more pragmatic wing of the Ba‘ath Party,
President al-Asad also developed good ties with the
Sunni bourgeoisie in Damascus right from the beginning
of his rule by leaving their privileges largely untouched
and even granting them new ones via the so-called
infitah, the 1970s policy of economic liberalization.
While this selective economic opening alienated the
more radical, Arab socialist elements of the Ba‘ath
party, the strategy nevertheless paid off from a regime-
maintenance perspective, as the conservative Damascene
bourgeoisie remained largely silent – and thus loyal – in
the context of the Sunni-Islamist antiregime uprising
that ended with the Hama massacre in 1982. In contrast,
several important religious-conservative merchants of the
souk (traditional market) in the northern city of Aleppo
supported and, in some cases, even joined the antiregime
rebellion. This was arguably due to the fact that they had
not been catered to in the same way as their Damascene
peers.
In July 2000, Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father, tak-
ing over the Syrian presidency as well as the leadership of
the armed forces and the Ba‘ath party. He not only had
to position himself within the inherited authoritarian-
personalist system (Hinnebusch, 2011), but also had
to tackle a number of new socio-economic and demo-
graphic challenges. Throughout the first decade of the
21st century, the new regime pursued wide-ranging neo-
liberal economic reforms, including the privatization of
state companies, a hiring freeze in the state administra-
tion, and the cutting of subsidies. These measures had
harsh negative effects on large parts of the population
(Haddad, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2012).
According to Fabrice Balanche (2011), it was precisely
the decreased availability of financial resources in times
of economic liberalization that contributed to the con-
tinuing and in some cases increased importance of
patron–client networks. Overall, the initial decade of this
century saw the end of the mass provision of goods and
the transition to targeted goods provision as a central
technique for political control (International Crisis
Group, 2011). Examples of how this plays out locally
abound: Balanche (2009) holds that key decisions about
local state service provision – such as the building of a
school or a health center, electricity connections, or the
exact routing of a street – depend crucially on clientelist
ties and, more broadly, follow a regime-maintenance
logic. De Chaˆtel (2014) shows that during the harsh
drought years of 2006 to 2009 in the agriculture-based
northeast, the regime provided emergency help first and
foremost to those selected, well-connected farmers who
had already profited from the distribution of state land
and subsidized fertilizers (see also Balanche, 2011). In
short, all kinds of services have been distributed according
to a specific political logic: sustaining the patron–client
networks that have become ever more important for the
regime’s stability (Balanche, 2009: 124). We focus on one
of these services – namely, the provision of electricity.
Electricity provision in Syria
The electricity sector in Syria is firmly in the hands of the
state. Although announcements have been made regard-
ing gradual restructuring and privatization, the regime’s
Ministry of Electricity and its subordinate agencies were
94 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(1)
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the only relevant actors in the sector when the uprising
began (World Bank, 2009). The energy sector is not
only controlled by the state but has also traditionally
played a pivotal role in the regime’s selective redistribu-
tion policy. When the Ba‘ath Party seized power in the
early 1960s, it launched a massive service-provision cam-
paign in order to drum up broad public support (Goul-
den, 2011). As a consequence, the rate of electrification
increased from 2% in 1963 to today’s impressive 99%
(Goulden, 2011; World Bank, 2009).2
According to information from the US Energy Infor-
mation Administration, however, Syria’s net energy con-
sumption dropped suddenly and substantially around
2008 (Energy Information Administration, 2011). Qua-
litative accounts from this period confirm the electricity
crisis and the substantial power cuts (Economic Intelli-
gence Unit, 2008, 2009a,b).3 As electricity became a
scarce resource, the regime had to take decisions on allo-
cation, identifying those regions that would receive elec-
tricity and those that would not. Press reports underscore
the fact that the distribution of electricity during this
time was not driven by technical factors but by a specific
policy of rationing. Rationalization plans were prepared
and had to be approved by the central government
(Oxford Business Group, 2010; BBC Monitoring Mid-
dle East, 2007). Power cuts did not happen ad hoc but
were planned by state electricity agencies and announced
by local newspapers in advance. Blackouts could last up
to five hours a day, with substantial variation across sub-
urbs (Naylor, 2007; Agence France Presse, 2009;
Xiaohua, 2007). In 2009 the Ministry of Electricity
launched a tender for generators to compensate for the
reduced capacities of public networks. These activities,
however, focused on selected urban areas only – namely,
Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Latakia (Eco-
nomic Intelligence Unit, 2009a,b). Given that the delib-
erate and politically motivated allocation of power cuts
has also been reported since the beginning of the upris-
ing in 2011,4 it comes as no surprise that the Ministry of
Electricity has been added to the EU sanctions list due to
its alleged use of power cuts as a means of repression
(European Union, 2012).
Due to the state’s control over electricity distribution
and the regime’s history of using the distribution of all
kinds of services – including electricity – strategically,
we argue that redistributive decisions made by the ruling
regime during the period of severe power shortages
(2007–09) should indicate which subdistricts were par-
ticularly favored by the ruling elite. In the following sec-
tion, we explain how we have empirically analyzed
whether these subdistricts displayed a lower risk of vio-
lence in the early phase of the Syrian civil war.
Design, data, and results
Our analysis is based on a newly generated dataset of Syr-
ian subdistricts (Arabic: nawahi, sg. nahiya). From the
total of 274 subdistricts, we excluded the nine Golan
Heights subdistricts due to their specific political status
and our assumption that the conflict dynamics here are
different from other areas in the country. Moreover,
we discarded four subdistricts due to their geographic
specificities: the island of Arwad and the three subdis-
tricts of Haritana, Jerablus, and Tall Daww, which each
consist of two geographically separated areas. This left us
with a total of 261 subdistricts out of 274, located in 13
of the country’s 14 governorates.
The dependent variable: Occurrence of violence
Our dependent variable is the occurrence of violence
during the first 18 months of the Syrian civil war, from
March 2011 to November 2012. To measure it, we
make use of crowdsourcing data. The basic idea of
crowdsourcing is to gather information in a decentralized
way, relying on information provided by people ‘on the
ground’. People submit their observations by email or
directly through various online platforms. Such systems
have been used in a variety of cases, notably for the
observation of violence or electoral processes.5
We used the data from an open, online platform
called Syria Tracker, which is part of the larger Humani-
tarian Tracker project – a non-political, non-partisan
organization. Reports on fatalities can be filed in Arabic
or English and include information on the exact location
(either by description of the location or pinpointing on a
digital map). The Syria Tracker team claims to make all
possible efforts to clean the data of duplications by
2 According to data from the 2004 national census, total access to
electricity has been around 97%. The deviation from the numbers
provided above may represent another slight increase from 2004 to
2009.
3 The background of the crisis is manifold. It is likely that while
demand increased constantly, Syria’s own generation capacity
decreased (World Bank, 2009).
4 In 2012 The Syria Report described how the Ministry of Electricity
increased and decreased power outages in various regions of the
country (Syria Report, 9 July 2012, cited after Lyme, 2012).
5 For example, to monitor elections in Liberia (http://
liberia.ushahidi.com/), or violence in Sudan (https://jan30sudan.crowd
map.com/).
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comparing the information provided in the reports.
Moreover, information from various online sources is
used to complement the events that have been reported
via the Syria Tracker platform. We critically discuss these
data and compare them with information from other
sources in a separate online appendix.
For our main dependent variable, we collapsed fatality
data into a binary indicator for the occurrence of violence
for the entire period of analysis, from the beginning of
the uprising in March 2011 to November 2012. We set
the threshold for positive coding of the variable at 25
reported deaths – in line with analogous country-level
thresholds (Gleditsch et al., 2002). We are aware that
collapsing fatality counts into a dichotomous variable
comes at the cost of losing substantial amounts of infor-
mation from the data. We believe, however, that there
are good theoretical reasons for focusing on a binary vari-
able for the occurrence of violence. Whereas preferential
treatment by the ruling elite may play an important role
in explaining where violence occurred, we assume that
other factors are more relevant in explaining where vio-
lence has been particularly intense. Put differently, while
we argue that inclusion in and exclusion from patron–
client networks can contribute to explaining why vio-
lence erupted in some areas but not in others, we find
it less plausible that patron–client networks can explain
variations in the severity of fighting across subdistricts.
While we therefore concentrate our main models on a
binary outcome variable, we have tested a number of
alternative specifications in the section on robustness
checks, including count models using the original fatality
counts as outcome variable. As expected, the results of
the count models are weaker but mirror the overall find-
ings of the main models presented below. The following
illustration depicts the geographical distribution of vio-
lent events across Syria’s subdistricts.
The independent variable: Access to electricity
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Opera-
tional Linescan System provides data from high-
resolution satellite images of the earth at night, display-
ing geographical variations in observable nightlights in
cities, towns, and other sites with permanent lighting,
including gas flares. Among others things, these pictures
are used to produce annual composite images; pictures
containing clouds or ephemeral events are discarded.
The respective digitized images contain information on
the annual average brightness per 30 arc-second grid. The
data values per pixel range from 0 to 63 (NOAA, 2013).
The specific advantage of these data is that they have
been produced independently of local political interfer-
ence. Moreover, they provide information beyond the
availability of public electricity infrastructure – namely,
on the regular flow of electrical power converted into
observable outdoor lighting. The images provide compa-
rable data on a yearly basis, allowing for consideration of
temporal variations in light output (Min, 2009).
These data have been used before to develop indica-
tors of electrification (Min, 2009) and socio-economic
development (Shortland, Christopoulou & Makatsoris,
2013). While we believe that nightlights are persuasive
indicators for these concepts, we are interested in another
aspect. We do not concentrate on static measures or on
longer-term developments but on the geographical dis-
tribution of nightlight outputs in moments of power
shocks. Focusing on very short-term variations – the
energy crisis of 2007–09 – allows us to minimize the risk
that observable spatiotemporal variations stem from pop-
ulation movements, socio-economic development, or
ongoing electrification.
In Syria, the residential sector is the biggest consumer
of electricity (World Bank, 2009), with approximately
70% going to lighting, refrigerators, and televisions
(Karaki et al., 2005). Overall, electricity is the main
power source for lighting in Syria. Consequently, obser-
vable nightlights should be a good indicator of people’s
actual access to electricity across time and across geogra-
phical areas.
As a first step, we used Geographic Information Sys-
tems software to generate the annual nightlight emissions
for the whole of Syria for the years 2004 to 2009 – the
five most recent years for which nightlight images from
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of fatalities in Syria,
March 2011 to November 2012
96 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(1)
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on April 21, 2015jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
a single satellite (F16) have been available. Comparing
nightlight data across satellites may be problematic due
to differences in light detection capabilities. For illustra-
tive reasons, however, we have also included data for
2003 and 2010 in Figure 2 to give some indication of
previous and subsequent trends. Temporal nightlight
variations are represented by the lower (blue) line in
Figure 2 (primary axis, total lights values of all pixels
within the Syrian borders).
As the need for planned power cuts (‘load shed-
ding’) does not just depend on the availability of elec-
tricity, we also investigate the temporal variation in
demand for electricity – plotted as the upper (red)
line in the same graph (secondary axis, kilowatt hours;
data from World Bank, 2009). The graph shows that
there was a drop in nightlight emissions from 2004 to
2005. This one-year decrease was, however, less pro-
nounced than that in the period from 2007 to
2009 under investigation. Moreover, demand was
substantially higher at the time of the second drop.
This may also explain why qualitative reports have
put so much emphasis on power cuts during the
2007–09 energy crisis. The graph lends support to the
argument that we are actually looking at a relevant time
period: in the years 2007–09 Syria experienced the most
recent and most substantial decline in the availability of
electricity prior to the uprising in 2011. Thus, patterns
of electricity redistribution during this period should
provide a valid proxy for patron–client networks before
the beginning of the violent conflict in 2011.
As a second step, we calculated mean light outputs
for each Syrian subdistrict separately.6 When we
inspect the light values more closely, we notice that
light outputs diminished in nearly all subdistricts from
2007 to 2008. However, some subdistricts started to
recover in the period 2008–09, whereas most others
suffered further output losses. Figure 2 illustrates the
development of the annual mean light outputs for those
subdistricts that experienced an increase of energy avail-
ability from 2008 to 2009 and those that experienced
further losses. We see that overall the subdistricts repre-
sented by the upper line also had a higher mean light
output and experienced less pronounced losses from
2007 to 2008. Given the measures taken by the Syrian
regime in 2008 and 2009 to counter the consequences
of the crisis, we interpret these observations as fairly
consistent indications that a specific group of subdis-
tricts was privileged in terms of general access to elec-
tricity. Accordingly, we use these observable variations
in light outputs as an indicator of the preferential treat-
ment of some Syrian subdistricts by the ruling elite. In
the online appendix, we provide a more technical dis-
cussion of why we believe that these variations are not
due to technical factors.
We have constructed three separate independent vari-
ables with the aim of capturing various facets of changes
and differences in light outputs, thereby increasing the
robustness of our operationalization. The first indicator
is the absolute change in mean light outputs from
2007 to 2009. As the absolute losses or gains may be
influenced by the original light output in 2007, our sec-
ond indicator is the change rate, dividing the absolute
increase or decrease by the mean light output in 2007.
The final indicator is a dummy variable that differenti-
ates between those subdistricts that experienced an
increase in mean light outputs from 2008 to 2009 and
those that did not. Figure 4 plots this last variable to
illustrate the spatial variations in increases and decreases
in light outputs during the electricity crisis.
Figure 2. Total nightlight emission and electricity demand in
Syria, 2003 to 2010
Figure 3. Subdistrict nightlight emission in Syria, 2003 to
2010
6 The light mean refers to the sum of the light values of all pixels
within a subdistrict divided by the total number of pixels. Thus, by
using mean values, we account for the differing size of subdistricts.
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Alternative explanations and control variables
The indicators we have used for our control variables
mainly stem from the country’s last population census,
undertaken in 2004. Although socio-economic and
political features of the subdistricts may have changed
in the seven-year period between the census and the
beginning of the uprising in 2011, we assume that this
time span was too short for any fundamental changes
in the differences across subdistricts to have occurred.
As our analyses only exploit such geographical variations,
we are confident that the census data provide effective
proxies for certain essential variables. If not explicitly
stated otherwise, the information for our control vari-
ables comes from the census.
Countries and subnational administrative units display
a higher risk of experiencing political violence when more
people live within their boundaries (Collier & Hoeffler,
2004). We have included log-transformed population size
in our analyses in order to account for excessive variations
in population size across Syrian subdistricts.
The Syrian civil war evolved out of mass protests that
began in the country’s semi-urban areas and eventually
spread to the urban centers. We have therefore included
information on subdistricts’ degrees of urbanization in
our analyses. Following the thresholds used by the
United Nations, our urbanization variable represents the
share of the population living in cities with more than
20,000 inhabitants.
The theoretical and empirical literature on political
violence has emphasized the role of grievances stemming
from low socio-economic development (see Gurr, 1993).
We consider primary school enrollment rates per subdis-
trict as a proxy for development levels.
Our main independent variables can only mirror var-
iations in the public provision of electricity if people pri-
marily use power from public networks, rather than from
private generators. We have thus included the share of
people with access to the state’s electricity network as a
control variable.
Studies that focus on opportunities for rebellion
emphasize the role of factors that facilitate recruitment
into armed groups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). We
include information on male unemployment rates per
subdistrict in our analyses.
Previous quantitative analyses of the subnational level
demonstrate that violence is less likely in areas where the
state maintains an effective presence (Buhaug, 2010).
The Syrian census includes information on the share of
people working for the state. We leverage this informa-
tion to control for variations in state presence across
subdistricts.
We use information on the Syrian road network pro-
vided by the UNDP to proxy accessibility. Using GIS
software, we have calculated the number of road kilo-
meters per subdistrict and divided it by the size of the
respective subdistrict areas.
It has been argued that Sunnis have formed the back-
bone of resistance against the regime. To the best of our
knowledge, no reliable data beyond rough approxima-
tions exist on the exact size and settlement areas of the
various communities. Moreover, most regions of Syria
have actually been ethnically and/or religiously mixed.
As part of a larger mapping project (Gulf 2000), Michael
Izady has generated a map displaying broad settlement
areas of all religious communities (Izady, 2012). We
exploit the map to construct a dummy variable that takes
on the value 1 for subdistricts that enclose Sunni settle-
ment areas and to construct another similar variable for
Alawi settlement areas.7
Finally, in the case of Syria, studies have emphasized
that local smuggling networks in the southern and north-
ern border districts have been a major resource for the
mobilization of resistance (Leenders & Heydemann,
2012). Thus, we control for the distance of each subdis-
trict’s center point to the nearest international border.
Although the census provides a series of relevant
socio-economic data, we did not have access to reliable
Figure 4. Nightlight increases in Syrian subdistricts, 2008 to
2009
7 As an alternative measure we constructed similar variables based on
data provided by the Geo Ethnic Power Relations Dataset
(Wucherpfennig et al., 2011). The results of the respective
estimations are reported in the online appendix (see Table AXV).
Our main explanatory variables are not affected by this alternative
measurement.
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data for other potentially relevant factors – for example,
the political affiliations of the executives of the regional
power suppliers across the country’s 14 governorates.
To account for these and other social, economic, or
political variations, we have included governorate-level
fixed effects in our model. More information on our
empirical strategy is provided in the next section.8
Model specification and results
In analyzing a binary variable, we have used logit models,
including governorate-level fixed effects. As part of our
robustness checks, described below, we have performed
alternative estimations using different models. Table I
presents estimation results for all three variations of our
independent variable in our primary fixed effects model.
Column 1 presents the results of our baseline model
without the inclusion of any nightlight variable. We find
that population size and urbanization play a highly sig-
nificant role. Both are positively related to the risk of vio-
lence and, thus, mirror the theoretically expected
connection. Neither the presence of Sunni settlement
areas nor the share of people that have access to the
national electricity grid seems to matter. The former may
be because the confessional dimension of the conflict did
not play a prominent role in the early phase of the upris-
ing in Syria but gradually gained in importance as
fighting became more intense. The fact that access to
public electricity networks does not seem to be relevant
underlines the claims made above: whether the share of a
subdistrict’s population with access to the electricity grid
is a little lower or higher than the average may say noth-
ing about the regime’s policy towards the subdistrict.
Column 2 estimates the logit model with our measure
of changes in light outputs between 2007 and 2009,
controlling for confounding factors and including fixed
effects at the governorate level. The coefficient is statisti-
cally significant below the 1% level and negative, indicat-
ing that the less a subdistrict experienced power losses
during the period under investigation, the lower the
probability that it experienced violence. Column 3 pre-
sents the results for the changes in light output in rela-
tion to the original output in 2007. Again, we find a
statistically significant association between changes in
light output and the likelihood of violence. From all
three conceptualizations of our variable, changes relative
to the original light output are weakest, with statistical
significance below the 5% level. In column 4, the night-
light dummy variable differentiates between those sub-
districts where light output further decreased after the
initial shortage in 2007 and those subdistricts where light
output started to increase again. We find the expected
connection with the likelihood of political violence, sta-
tistically significant below the 1% level.
Because we deal with rather technical and abstract
indicators for our explanatory variables, we do not aim
to provide exact coefficients for the strength of the corre-
lations found. To demonstrate, however, that the effects
Table I. Occurrence of violence in Syrian subdistricts, March 2011 to November 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov. employees –0.008 (0.662) –0.010 (0.627) –0.005 (0.805) –0.021 (0.316)
Sunni 0.355 (0.597) 0.282 (0.691) 0.323 (0.640) 0.152 (0.832)
Alawi 0.026 (0.977) –0.040 (0.969) 0.118 (0.903) –0.116 (0.905)
Prim. enrollment 0.026 (0.868) –0.049 (0.761) 0.006 (0.971) 0.066 (0.700)
Border dist. (log) –0.212 (0.457) 0.000 (0.999) 0.021 (0.946) 0.005 (0.987)
Urbanization 2.300* (0.011) 2.681** (0.005) 2.553** (0.007) 2.587** (0.006)
Electricity 0.011 (0.925) –0.010 (0.929) 0.075 (0.555) 0.021 (0.861)
Unemployment 0.003 (0.956) –0.007 (0.900) –0.010 (0.850) 0.008 (0.881)
Road density –2.018y (0.059) –2.428* (0.046) –1.535 (0.162) –2.026y (0.073)
Population (log) 1.854*** (0.000) 1.758*** (0.000) 1.924*** (0.000) 1.742*** (0.000)
Lights change –0.434** (0.003)
Lights rel. change –5.740* (0.029)
Lights pos. change –1.849** (0.008)
Observations 247 247 247 247
AIC 135.726 127.967 132.859 129.376
ll –57.863 –52.983 –55.430 –53.688
p-values in parentheses; yp < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
8 We have also calculated a variable that totals the number of fatalities
in all neighboring subdistricts and included it as an additional control
(see Table AXVI).
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are different from zero, we simulate marginal effects for
our main models. Predicted probabilities cannot be
directly calculated from the conditional fixed effects logit
models presented in the results table. Instead, we have re-
estimated the main models with governorate dummy
variables (and robust clustered standard errors). The
results mirror those presented above (detailed table in the
online appendix). In a second step, holding all other vari-
ables at their respective means, we have estimated the
predicted probabilities per governorate. To provide for
a general idea of the strength of the effects, we have cal-
culated their means across all governorates: As we move
from the fifth to the 95th percentiles of our first main
variable, the risk of violence drops from 43% to approx-
imately 4% on average across governorates. The effects
of the two other variables are weaker. The risk of violence
drops from 33% to 4% in a similar simulation for the
nightlight change rate; subdistricts that display an
increase in light outputs from 2008 to 2009 show a
16% lower risk of experiencing violence than other
subdistricts.9
Before discussing these findings in light of recent qua-
litative analyses, we implement a series of additional
robustness checks to further establish the strength of the
findings in the following paragraphs. The detailed results
and regression tables are provided in the online appendix.
Robustness checks10
For the operationalization of our dependent variable, we
defined a threshold of 25 fatalities. Although this specific
number has been widely applied in the coding of violent
conflicts at the country level, it is – like all other thresh-
olds – arbitrary. Therefore, we have repeated our estima-
tions with four alternative thresholds (5, 10, 20, and 50
fatalities). The results correspond to those obtained with
our initial operationalization but are weakest with the
threshold set at five fatalities (see Tables AII–AV).
For our dependent variable, we have considered fatal-
ities during the period from March 2011 to November
2012. The end point of the period has been defined
by the time we began our analyses and the last month for
which data were available. Thus, to control for this rather
arbitrary time frame, we have performed analyses using
another end point, re-estimating our main model for a
shorter period – from March 2011 to February 2012.
Again, our initial findings are confirmed (see Table AVI
in the online appendix).
To further demonstrate that our findings are not
related to the operationalization and measurement of our
outcome, we have estimated actual count models using
two different sources: the original fatality counts pro-
vided by Syria Tracker and event data from the Global
Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) dataset,
which is based on reports from international news
sources (Leetaru & Schrodt, 2013). More information
on the latter data as well as the creation of the Syria data
subset that we used is provided in the online appendix.
Our variables perform more weakly but in a similar way
in the count models (see Tables AVII–AXI in the online
appendix). Most notably, while the variables generally
show the right sign in the models using GDELT data,
we find a significant association with total counts only
for absolute nightlight changes.11
Because we have emphasized the urban character
of the early stage of the Syrian civil war, it may be
the case that the country’s largest cities display spe-
cific links between access to electricity and reports
on fatalities. Accordingly, we have excluded the gover-
norate capitals from our sample and repeated our
analyses without any major changes to our results (see
Table AX).
Finally, we have tried to rule out some plausible alter-
native explanations for the correlation between night-
light change and occurrence of violence. As mentioned
above, the nightlight data include gas flares. Syria is an
oil-producing country with numerous oil and gas fields
in the eastern part of the country. Lights emanating from
gas flares will not be affected by power cuts. Such strate-
gic resources may also be particularly well protected by
security personnel, leading to lower risks of violence
occurrence. We did not possess detailed data on the exact
location of oil and gas fields; the petroleum dataset pro-
vided by Lujala, Rod & Thieme (2007) only contains
information on their approximate location. We com-
pared the data with maps retrieved from the Syrian oil
company Al Furat Petroleum. Based on these two
sources, we identified five governorates with varying
9 For the latter two variables, effects are significant only in single
governorates. We believe, however, that this has mainly been due
to the fact that we had to predict probabilities on the governorate
level and that many of them provide a low number of observations
and little variation in the outcome variable.
10 Wherever possible, we have clustered standard errors at the
governorate level.
11 Allison &Waterman (2002) show that fixed effects count models,
as implemented by STATA, do not in fact control for time-invariant
unobserved factors. We have estimated STATA built-in fixed effects
and dummies. In the latter GDELT models, our main explanatory
variables show the right sign but are not statistically significant.
100 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 52(1)
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on April 21, 2015jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
numbers of oil and gas fields. As a robustness check, we
excluded these governorates from the dataset and
repeated our standard estimation. For the remaining
164 observations, the role of our light output variables
was unchanged (see Table AXI).
A similar argument as for oil can be made for the role
of industry. Industrial production consumes approxi-
mately 37 percent of Syria’s total energy. The state may
have tried to avert power cuts in highly industrialized
regions for economic reasons. Again, these areas may also
have large numbers of security forces due to their eco-
nomic importance. This may drive associations between
nightlight change and the risk of violence. We used census
information on the share of people working in the indus-
trial sector as a proxy for subdistrict industrialization,
without any effect on our main variables (see Table AXII).
In the online appendix we discuss why we believe that
variations in nightlight emissions are not determined by
technical factors alone. Nonetheless, for a more systema-
tic robustness check, we have estimated an additional
model that controls for the distance of each subdistrict’s
center from the nearest power station. These stations
may be situated in regime strongholds rather than the
periphery. The greater the distance to these stations, the
lower the quality of electricity provision (network losses
may increase with distance) and the lower the repressive
capacity of the state. This additional control has no effect
on our explanatory variables (see Table AXIII).
Finally, the share of households with private genera-
tors is likely to be higher in wealthier regions. These
regions may suffer less from electricity shortages and
have higher opportunity costs for rebellion. If this is the
case, we may not be capturing the regime’s co-optation
strategy but rather spatial economic disparities. We have
thus controlled for the subdistrict-level share of people
who own the house they live in, without significant
changes to our main results (see Table AXIV).
Discussion of results
Our empirical findings lend support to our hypothesis
that patterns of selective goods provision correlate with
geographical patterns of violence in Syria. We believe
that our indicators provide a persuasive proxy for the
selective goods provision associated with patron–client
networks. However, we cannot make strong causal
claims based on a cross-sectional analysis alone. We
therefore briefly discuss our findings in light of previous
qualitative analysis of the actual role of patron–client
networks in the subnational distribution of violence dur-
ing the civil war. The aim of this section is to illustrate
that our arguments and findings resonate well with pre-
vious qualitative evidence.
Detailed qualitative studies of different Syrian localities
since early 2011 strongly indicate that villages, towns, or
cities without ties to dense regime-based patron–client
networks before the uprising have indeed been very likely
to experience violence in the early phase of the civil war.
The southern provincial city of Dar‘a, in which the upris-
ing began in mid-March 2011, is a case in point. In what
was traditionally a Ba‘athist stronghold and the adminis-
trative center of the Hawran governorate, local state insti-
tutions gradually withdrew from the city and the adjacent
region since the 1990s, thereby weakening the previously
strong patron–client ties between the regime and impor-
tant local constituencies (Leenders & Heydemann,
2012). The local political economy in and around Dar‘a
declined, and the regime’s local ‘presence took the shape
of corrupt and incompetent civilian officials, equally rapa-
ciousmembers of the security forces and a rather provoca-
tive camp staffed with Allawite [Alawi] officers and their
families’ (International Crisis Group, 2012a). This was
a far cry from the Ba‘athist regime’s previous multifaceted
existence in Dar‘a. Early on in the uprising, the protesters
addressed this constellation directly. They called for the
withdrawal of the corrupt governor and the local head
of security and demanded state measures to better the
socio-economic malaise (International Crisis Group,
2012a; Leenders & Heydemann, 2012).
Beyond Dar‘a, and as explained above, the uprising
quickly spread to other villages, towns, and provincial
cities across Syria. While a host of context-specific fea-
tures contributed to the respective dynamics of local con-
flicts, a determining factor in provincial cities such as
Idlib, Jisr Ash-Shughour, Maarat an-Nu’man, Rastan,
and Talbissah was – in Fabrice Balanche’s words – ‘the
disinvestment of the state’ (2013: 8). As these examples
from central and northern Syria show, the uprising and
ensuing civil war developed against the background of
the gradual withdrawal of the local state from several
rural and semi-urban regions, which ended a – albeit par-
tial – favorable regime redistribution policy. In a way, the
Syrian protesters initially reacted to this process by
demanding that the respective localities be reincorpo-
rated into regime-based clientelist networks. As Balanche
(2013) argues, the geographical variation in this ‘disin-
vestment’ played an essential role in determining
whether or not villages engaged significantly against the
state during the uprising.
The nexus between material redistribution and the
likelihood of violence in the civil war can be observed not
only across villages, towns, and cities, but also across
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different neighborhoods and quarters within the same
city. As Salwa Ismail recently noted regarding the Syrian
capital, ‘Relations with the regime and the demographic
composition of quarters are the main variables at play in
the differentiated responses to the Uprising observed in
Damascus and elsewhere’ (Ismail, 2013: 883). Informal
quarters on the outskirts of the city – such as Mezza 86,
in which the Ba‘athist regime has continuously invested
since the settlement’s establishment in the 1970s – have
therefore remained calm during the emerging civil war.
In contrast to Mezza 86, similarly structured informal
neighborhoods such as Barzeh or Qaboun, which were
not part of the regime’s patron–client networks, have
become strongholds of the violent rebellion (Ismail,
2013). A similar effect of the regime’s differential treat-
ment on the likelihood of violence in the ensuing civil
war can also be observed in Damascus’s traditional quar-
ters Midan and Rukn al-Din (Ismail, 2013), as well as in
the capital’s outskirts, especially in the east and south
(International Crisis Group, 2011a).
Taken together, there is ample qualitative evidence sup-
porting the claim that the selective redistribution of scarce
resources took place in areas where the regime had strong
clientelist networks. Those areas with weak ties to these
networks faced an increased risk of violence during the civil
war; those areas with strong ties have remained calm.
Conclusions
Our analysis confirms earlier findings from cross-country
analyses of how the redistribution of state resources
impacts the risk of violence – that is, how patron–client
networks in which political support is provided in return
for preferential treatment influence the risk of violence
against the state.Although some subdistricts contradict our
theoretical argument, our empirical analyses provide con-
sistent and robust evidence that inclusion in patron–client
networks and selective redistribution have played a role in
reducing the likelihood of certain subdistricts experiencing
violence during the early phase of the civil war in Syria.We
are thus able to provide support for the hypothesis that
selective redistribution can contribute to reducing the risk
of violent opposition in beneficiary regions.
Empirically, we provide support for the growing num-
ber of analyses that make use of new, rather unconven-
tional data sources, such as nightlights and crowdsourcing.
Although we are aware of the potential shortcomings and
risks of using such data, we have shown how they can con-
tribute to analyses in settings marked by the limited avail-
ability of reliable data – for example, in authoritarian
regime contexts or situations of openwarfare. In terms of the
more specific operationalization of material redistribution,
our analyses demonstrate the need to consider the actual
provision of respective services and not general access alone.
In our case, it was not access to the national electricity grid
but rather the variation in the provision of electricity that
mattered. Finally, we provide an example of how temporal
developments (for example, previous changes in nightlights)
may be exploited in order to measure dynamics of redistri-
bution that cannot be captured using static data alone.
Building on these insights, future research on the
nexus of patron–client relations, selective redistribution,
and political violence could proceed along three avenues.
First, future research should study more than one public
good. The selective distribution of other goods or of
‘packages’ of goods should enable the more robust oper-
ationalization of strategic decisions on material redistri-
bution by ruling regimes. Second, our analysis focuses
on one country alone. Cross-country, subnational analy-
ses could scrutinize our findings. The global availability
of nightlight data as well as the growing number of geogra-
phically disaggregated event datasets may allow for such
analyses in a selected number of cases. Third, we have
examined our hypothesis in the context of a highly author-
itarian regime in a society divided along multiple lines.
Future studies may wish to focus on democratic countries
and/or countries with other ethnopolitical features.
Replication data
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this
article, along with the online appendix, can be found at
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. All estimations have
been made using Stata version 12.0. Geo-processing has
been made with QGIS 2.0.0.
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